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THE CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY OF THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, POLICY
IMPLICATIONS & LITIGATION STRATEGY,
A PANEL DISCUSSION SPONSORED BY THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 14, 1995
Julie Goldscheid
INTRODUCTION
I would like formally to welcome you to our panel discussion
on the 1994 Violence Against Women Act' ["VAWA"] Civil
Rights Remedy Panel discussing VAWA's legislative history, and
policy implications, as well as addressing strategies for litigating
under this new civil rights provision. I do not know how many of
you know this, but yesterday was the one year anniversary of the
signing of the Violence Against Women Act, so it is very timely
that we are having this panel here tonight.
" Julie Goldscheid is a staff attorney at the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund ("NOW LDEF"). She is the lead attorney for the organization's
litigation and education efforts to end violence against women and also litigates
issues of sexual harassment in the schools. She has published articles on litigating
under the Violence Against Women Act's ("VAWA") ground breaking civil
rights remedy and is currently involved in representing women who are litigating
initial claims under that remedy. In addition, Ms. Goldscheid teaches Women and
the Law at New York University School of Law. Ms. Goldscheid received her
J.D., cum laude, from New York University School of Law in 1991, after which
she clerked for the Honorable Gary S. Stein of the New Jersey Supreme Court
and was an Associate at Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal.
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108
Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C.
(1994)).
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The enactment of the Violence Against Women Act marked an
historic moment in our country's history because it was the first
time that the federal government recognized, with a bipartisan
blessing from Congress, the pervasiveness of and the devastation
that results from violence against women. The civil rights remedy,2
on which we will focus tonight, is one historic and ground breaking
provision of VAWA.3
Our goal tonight is to provide guidance to lawyers who may
represent women who have survived gender-based violence in
VAWA claims. Since it is a new remedy, I imagine you have
questions about how it will be used.4 Our goal is to address who
can use the civil rights remedy and consider under what circum-
stances it will prove most useful, identify practical guidelines for
practitioners who are interested in identifying VAWA cases and
discuss litigation strategies. 5
2 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The civil rights remedy provides, in pertinent
part:
(b) ... All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender ....
(c) Cause of Action. A person (including a person who acts under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who
commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another
of the right declared in subsection (b) shall be liable to the party injured, in
an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive
and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate.
Id.
' In addition to the civil rights remedy, VAWA contains criminal provisions
that create new federal felonies for acts of interstate domestic violence and
interstate violations of protective orders. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66 (1994). The
VAWA also authorizes $1.6 billion dollars in funding for a wide range of
programs to prevent and address violence against women. See generally Violence
Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (Sept. 13, 1994).
' See First Person Convicted Under Violence-Against-Women Act,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 1, 1995, at 13; see generally Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Epilogue: Making Reconceptualization of Violence Against Women
Real, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1245 (1995).
' For a more complete discussion of litigation strategies in VAWA cases, see
Julie Goldscheid & Susan Kraham, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 505 (1995).
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I want to thank the Civil Rights Committee of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York ("City Bar") for sponsoring
this panel discussion, and I also want to thank all of the many
cosponsoring committees and organizations.6 The terrific support
from all of the cosponsors helped make this discussion a success.
I also want to thank Lenora Lapidus7 and Sandy Hauser8 who,
with me, formed the subcommittee that organized this panel.
6 The panel discussion was cosponsored by the following Committees of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Committee on Civil Rights;
Committee on Federal Courts; Committee on Family Court and Family Law;
Committee on Sex and Law; Committee on Tort Litigation; Committee on
Women in the Courts; Committee on Lectures and Continuing Education. The
panel discussion was in conjunction with the following organizations: American
Civil Liberties Union, Women's Rights Project; American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey; Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund; Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund; NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund;
National Lawyer's Guild; New Jersey State Bar Association, and its Individual
Rights Special Committee, Family Law Section, Civil Trial Bar Section and
Certified Trial Attorney's Section; New Jersey State Coalition Against Sexual
Assault; New Jersey Coalition for Battered Women; New York Coalition Against
Domestic Violence; New York State Bar Association, Committee on Women in
the Law; New York Women's Bar Association; NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund; Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Latina Rights
Initiative and the Victim Services Agency.
" Lenora M. Lapidus is the 1994-96 John J. Gibbons Fellow in Public
Interest and Constitutional Law at Crummy, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger &
Vecchione in Newark, New Jersey. As a Gibbons Fellow, Ms. Lapidus litigates
a broad range of public interest and civil rights cases; she currently represents a
battered woman who was convicted of homicide for the killing of her estranged
husband. Ms. Lapidus received her J.D., cum laude, from Harvard Law School
in 1990; she clerked for the Honorable Richard Owen in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York from 1990-92 and was a
Fellowship Attorney at the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy in New York
from 1992-94.
8 Sandra D. Hauser is presently an associate in the New York office of
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal. Before moving into private practice, she spent
four and a half years as a staff attorney at the Center on Social Welfare Policy
and Law in New York. Ms. Hauser is a 1991 graduate of Harvard Law School
and a 1988 graduate of the University of Michigan. She serves on the Civil
Rights Committee and the Project on the Homeless of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York.
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My name is Julie Goldscheid. I am a staff attorney at the
NOW9 Legal Defense and Education Fund ("NOW LDEF" or
"Fund") and a member of the Civil Rights Committee of the City
Bar. The NOW Legal Defense Fund chaired the national task force
of over 1000 groups that lobbied hard for over four years to urge
passage of VAWA. It remains active in monitoring VAWA's
enforcement and devising new strategies to stop violence against
women. Sally Goldfarb, who is one of our panelists tonight and a
former senior staff attorney at the Fund, will talk about what that
process was like. At NOW Legal Defense Fund, we have estab-
lished a legal clearinghouse on the Violence Against Women Act,
through which we are tracking litigation and other legal develop-
ments under the Act.' ° We are available for and regularly provide
technical assistance to lawyers, advocates and service providers
concerning VAWA in particular, and violence against women in
general. "
We have five distinguished speakers with us tonight. Each will
speak for about ten minutes and then we will open the floor for
your questions and discussion. The transcript from tonight's
proceedings will be published in the Journal of Law and Policy
which is published by Brooklyn Law School. So your friends who
could not attend tonight can still learn from the presentations.
I want briefly to introduce each of our speakers ahead of time
and then each will begin her presentation in turn. Our first speaker
is Sally Goldfarb who is an associate professor at Rutgers
University, School of Law in Camden. As I said, she formerly was
a senior staff attorney at NOW Legal Defense Fund where she
worked for nine years and she co-chaired the Violence Against
Women Act Task Force which worked to enact the bill. While she
was at the Fund, she was an adjunct professor and taught Women
and the Law at New York University Law School. Before she was
9 "NOW" stands for the National Organization for Women.
'0 In the months following the panel discussion, NOW LDEF has become
involved in two of the first cases to be litigated under the VAWA civil rights
remedy. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 95-CV-
1358-R (W.D. Va. filed Mar. 4, 1996); Doe v. Doe, No. 95-CV-2722 (D. Conn.
filed Feb. 12, 1996).
" The NOW LDEF can be reached at (212) 925-6635.
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at the Fund, she clerked for the federal district court after gradu-
ating from Yale Law School. Sally will discuss the Act's legislative
history, including the process of lobbying for its passage, and ways
that practitioners can use the legislative history in litigation.
Our second speaker is Betty Levinson of Levinson & Kaplan.
She is a family law practitioner who has been counsel in a number
of novel cases seeking to further the rights of women, particularly
survivors of domestic violence. She was counsel for amici in Bruno
v Codd,12 which was a successful challenge to the mistreatment
of women by the Family Court, the police department and the
probation department. She was counsel in People v Green which
involved the use of expert testimony to avoid a homicide indict-
ment of a battered woman. She is currently counsel for Hedda
Nussbaum in her civil damage action against Joel Steinberg 13 in
which she is seeking to obtain a toll of New York State's statute of
limitations which restricts the time in which a battered woman may
bring a civil cause of action for assault against her batterer."4 In
addition to her practice, she teaches and lectures extensively on
these and other litigation issues. Betty will discuss how the civil
rights remedy compliments other civil remedies currently available
for victims of gender-based violence.
Jenny Rivera is an assistant professor of law at Suffolk
University Law School in Boston. Before that, she was a judicial
clerk for the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor in the Southern District
of New York. She was also an Administrative Law Judge at the
New York State Division on Human Rights. She was Associate
Counsel for PRLDEF [Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education
Fund] for a number of years where she worked on education and
employment discrimination cases, on equity and testing and on
language rights discrimination. She was the founding member of
PRLDEF's Latina Rights Initiative, and she currently serves as a
12 Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d (1979).
'3 See People v. Steinberg, 79 N.Y.2d 673, 595 N.E.2d 845, 584 N.Y.S.2d
770 (1992). Joel Steinberg was convicted in the Supreme Court, New York
County, of the first degree manslaughter of his adopted six-year-old daughter,
Lisa Steinberg, in 1992.
14 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 208 (McKinney 1990); Nussbaum v. Steinberg,
204 N.Y. L.J. 21, 21 (1990).
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co-chairperson of the Initiative's Advisory Committee. In addition,
after graduating from NYU Law School, she served as a pro se
clerk in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and was a Staff
Attorney at the Homeless Family Rights Project of Legal Aid. She
serves on various boards and recently published an article on
Domestic Violence against Latinas."5 Jenny will discuss how the
Violence Against Women Act civil rights remedy compliments
other civil rights remedies to vindicate the rights of women,
particularly women of color.
N6el Brennan is the Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the
Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice. That Office
provides federal leadership, coordination and assistance to help state
and local jurisdictions fight crime and improve the justice system.
Part of the Office's responsibilities include federal efforts to end
violence against women. Before her appointment to the Department
of Justice, she served as an assistant district attorney in the District
of Columbia. After graduating from Georgetown Law Center,
where she is currently a member of the adjunct faculty, she was a
law clerk for the District of Columbia Superior Court and the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. She will address the
current public policy concerns surrounding the Violence Against
Women Act from the federal perspective, addressing both the
Violence Against Women Act, in general, and the civil rights
remedy in particular.
Our final panelist is Elizabeth Schneider, a professor of law at
Brooklyn Law School and a visiting professor at Harvard Law
School. She teaches Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Women
and the Law, and Battered Women and the Law. She has published
and lectured nationally in all of these fields. She graduated from
Bryn Mawr College in 1968 and was a Levorholm Fellow at the
London School of Economics and Political Science. She received
her J.D. from New York University School of Law where she was
an Arthur Garfield Hayes Civil Liberties Fellow. She is currently
writing a book on feminist theory and practice and violence against
"s Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An
Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 231 (1994).
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women, and is co-authoring a casebook on domestic violence. She
will address the role the civil rights remedy plays as a part of a
broader theoretical framework for using the legal system to stop
violence against women.




Thanks, Julie. The Violence Against Women Act' declares for
the first time that violent crimes motivated by gender are discrimi-
natory and violate the victim's civil rights under federal law.2
Since this legislation was enacted almost exactly a year ago,
victims of violent felonies that are committed because of gender or
on the basis of gender, and that are due, at least in part, to an
animus based on gender, may bring a civil lawsuit in federal court
to seek redress for the violation of their civil rights.3 A successful
plaintiff can win compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief and court-ordered attorney's fees.'
What was the vision that led us to the drafting and passage of
the Violence Against Women Act-and I use "us" in a very broad
sense, since this was a massive effort nationally over the course of
four and a half years? The concept behind this legislation was that
because of gender-based violence, American women and girls are
relegated to a form of second-class citizenship.' Women and girls
must fear not only all of the same crimes that affect men and boys,
but also those that are targeted exclusively or overwhelmingly
. Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. Yale
University, J.D.; Yale University, B.A.
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108
Stat. 1902 (civil rights provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
3id
4 Id; 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994).
' See, e.g., S. REP. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1991) [hereinafter
1991 SENATE REPORT] ("Women bear the disproportionate burden of some of
the most pernicious crimes.. . .At the same time, survivors of these crimes often
face barriers to justice not shared by male victims of assault ... ."); see also
Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on
Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violence Against Women, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., Part 1, 57 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Senate Hearing] (gender-
based violence causes a form of second-class citizenship; statement of Helen
Neuborne).
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against female members of our society.6 Just as we, in the course
of American history, have passed civil rights laws to redress race-
based and religious-based violence, 7 so too it was necessary to pass
a law designed to redress gender-based violence!
Obviously, some of the most basic insights of the feminist
movement were brought to bear on this effort. Crimes like rape and
domestic violence both reflect and reinforce women's subordi-
nation, and the resulting climate of terror makes all women, even
those who have not themselves been victimized, unable to parti-
cipate as equals in American society. Antidiscrimination laws that
promise equality in the workplace, in schools, in the community,
in the family, are worth little if our physical safety and bodily
integrity are still at risk. Although these principles may seem
straightforward and uncontroversial to those of us in this room,
making the case for this legislation was not always easy.
On the record, as part of the legislative history, witnesses came
forward to testify at Congressional hearings to prove several crucial
points: that violence against women is a pervasive problem; that
state laws are not adequate to address the problem; that existing
federal civil rights laws were not adequate either; and finally, that
rape and domestic violence are a form of discrimination.' It was
also necessary, of course, to have testimony that Congress has the
constitutional authority to enact this legislation under both the
Commerce Clause 0  and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Meanwhile, while we were going through these efforts on the
record, behind the scenes the challenges were even more daunting.
6 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 5, at 58 (statement of Helen Neuborne).
7 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1994).
s 1991 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 42-43.
See generally Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter 1993 House Hearing];
Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); 1990
Senate Hearing, supra note 5; 1991 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 42-54.
'o U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
" 1991 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 52-54 (citing testimony of
Professors Burt Neuborne and Cass Sunstein).
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The civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act was
very controversial from the outset. 2 The objections to it included,
first of all, that it would overload the federal courts, and secondly,
that it wouldn't do any good because no cases would be brought.
This was particularly confusing because in some instances the same
people were bringing up both these arguments. We were told that
the remedy was too broad and that it was too narrow. That it was
too punitive and not punitive enough. Obviously those of us who
lobbied on this bill had our work cut out for us.
The attacks came from both right and left13 as well as from
some self-styled feminists who objected that this legislation would
be patronizing to women because it implied that women need
special protection.'4 As to whether women need and deserve
protection from violence, I submit that the statistics on rape and
domestic violence speak for themselves. 5 Furthermore, the
legislation is drafted in a gender-neutral manner. Anyone, male or
female, who is the victim of gender-motivated violence as defined
in the bill can bring a cause of action.
2 Naftali Ben-David, The Surprising Volatility of the Violence Against
Women Act, LEGAL TIMEs, June 29, 1994, at 16; see also Jack Sirica, Federal
Protection of Women at Issue, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1992, at 17 (citing the Bush
Administration, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, ABA President Talbot
D'Alemberte and Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA) as among those voicing concerns
that the civil rights provision of the bill would overburden the federal court
system and unnecessarily expand its jurisdiction and authority).
"3 See David Frazee, Gender-Justice Breakthrough, ON THE ISSUES, Fall
1995, at 42 (describing efforts by American Civil Liberties Union to "sabotage"
the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights provision, in part because it
would "adversely affect other civil rights lawsuits" by flooding the federal
courts); John Leo, Radical Feminism in the Senate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 19, 1993, at 19 (attacking the Violence Against Women Act civil rights
provision as an expression of "radical... gender feminis[m]").
"4 See, e.g., Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993,
at 12; Cathy Young, Gender Poisoning: In the Bobbitt Era, Facing the Real
Truth About Male Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1994, at C5; see also Debate
Rages Over Definition of Rape and Date Rape (National Public Radio broadcast,
Sept. 1, 1993) (citing view of some women that the provision would codify
fictitious notions of a rape epidemic).
"5 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 545, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-45 (1990) (statistics
on rape and domestic violence).
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Well, the Violence Against Women Act, including the civil
rights provision, did finally pass as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,16 due largely to the
stalwart support of Senator Joseph Biden [D-Del.], Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the original sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act, and also to the support of Senator
Orrin Hatch [R-Utah], who became the lead cosponsor of the bill
after a series of compromises in the bill language which I'll discuss
in a moment. Important help was also provided by Senator Barbara
Boxer [D-Cal.], both when she was in the House and later when
she joined the Senate. And House passage of the Violence Against
Women Act took place under the able leadership of Representatives
Pat Schroeder [D-Colo.], Chuck Schumer [D-N.Y], Louise
Slaughter [D-N.Y] and Connie Morella [R-Md.]. 17
As the Violence Against Women Act neared the end of its
somewhat tortuous passage through Congress, the civil rights
provision, having attracted a great deal of controversy, squeaked
through the Conference Committee by only one vote. Nevertheless,
by the time the battle was joined between Congress and the
President over what the final crime bill would look like, the
Violence Against Women Act was virtually lost in the shuffle. You
might recall that in the waning days of August last year [ 1994], the
headlines were full of raging debates about so-called "pork"
programs in the crime bill, such as midnight basketball games.'"
Meanwhile, the Violence Against Women Act, once such a
lightning rod for criticism and controversy, had now become so
widely accepted that the New York imes actually ran an article
basically saying, "if there's one section of the crime bill that
16 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (civil rights provision of VAWA is
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981).
17 The version of the bill passed by the House of Representatives omitted the
civil rights provision. H. REP. No. 395, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1993). The
House then receded to the Senate bill's civil rights provision in conference. H.
REP. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 385-86 (1994).
" See, e.g., Erik Brady, Program "Does Make Difference, " USA TODAY,
Aug. 19, 1994, at 2C; Heather Bruce, Prevention or Pork? Crime Bill Debate
Flares, BOsTON GLOBE, Aug. 17, 1994, at 22.
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everyone believes is a good idea, it is the Violence Against Women
Act." 19
A lot of work had gone into bringing us to that point. How did
we get there? First of all, it was truly a grassroots effort. As Julie
mentioned, the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund had
founded the National Task Force on the Violence Against Women
Act, which ultimately encompassed more than 1000 organizations
and individuals throughout the country: labor groups, women's
groups, civil rights, religious organizations, community groups and
so on, all of them concerned about the problem of rape, domestic
violence and other forms of violence against women. It certainly
was not the first time that a national coalition had been formed to
pass federal legislation. But I think the coalition's extraordinary
success was because the issue touched a nerve among so many
American women.
Violence against women clearly was an issue of almost
universal concern, and it had the ability to galvanize women from
throughout the country, from every walk of life, and from every
spot on the political spectrum. In fact, women in the grassroots put
extraordinary pressure on their elected officials, and they also
pressured organizations to which they belonged to endorse the
legislation. For example, the AFL-CIO, the National Education
Association, and the NAACP [National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People] all endorsed the Violence Against
Women Act largely based on pressure from within, from the female
rank and file. By the time we came to the end of this process, the
Task Force had lined up support for this legislation from groups
ranging from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force to the Girl
Scouts to Feminists For Life and pretty much everybody in
between.
'9 Catherine S. Manegold, Quiet Winners in House Fight on Crime: Women,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1994, at A19. But see Sink the Crime Bill, RICHMOND
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994, at A8 (urging U.S. Senate to defeat crime bill, including
"absurd" civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act); Some
Congressmen Critical of Violence Against Women Act (National Public Radio
broadcast, Aug. 18, 1994) (citing concerns by Representative Mike Synar (D-
Okla.) and some federal judges about "federalizing" claims arising from violence
against women).
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It also helped that this was a consummate bipartisan effort. I
mentioned that Senator Hatch was the lead cosponsor. There were
67 Senate cosponsors and 225 cosponsors in the House, from both
sides of the aisle. We shouldn't overlook the fact too that there
were finally women in real positions of power to help shepherd this
through. At a time when much of the judiciary was opposing the
Violence Against Women Act,20 the National Association of
Women Judges supported it.2 Women members of Congress were
extremely instrumental, as were feminist staff members on Capitol
Hill. Feminist law professors including [fellow panelist] Elizabeth
Schneider spoke to Congress about this legislation. Bonnie
Campbell, who currently heads the effort within the U.S. Justice
Department to implement this bill, acted in her capacity at that time
as Attorney General of the state of Iowa, together with then-
Attorney General of New York Bob Abrams, to line up forty-one
state Attorneys General to endorse the legislation.2 2 So if anyone
tells you that having women in positions of power makes no
difference, don't believe it.
And of course, let's not overlook the fact that the Anita
Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings had a major effect on the outcome
of the 1992 elections, 23 and Congress was looking for ways to
20 See Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and
the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1687-88 (1991). The Judicial
Conference of the United States later retracted its opposition. Victoria Nourse,
The Violence Against Women Act: A Legislative History, in VIOLENCE AGAINST
WoMEN: LAW AND PRACTICE (David Frazee & Ann Noel eds., forthcoming
1996) [hereinafter A Legislative History].
2, A Legislative History, supra note 20 (citing statement of Hon. Judith
Billings, President, National Association of Women Judges, reprinted in 1993
House Hearing, supra note 9, at 30-32).
22 1993 House Hearing, supra note 9, at 34-36 (letter from Robert Abrams
et al. to Hon. Jack Brooks, Chair, House Judiciary Committee (July 22, 1993)).
23 See, e.g., Martha Burk, 'Year of the Woman': First of Many, U.S.A.
TODAY, Nov. 5, 1992, at 19A.
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make amends to women. 24 All those things came together to
ensure the success of the legislation.
Let's turn now to what the legislation actually says. What did
we win when we won the civil rights provision of the Violence
Against Women Act? The statute states that "all persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of
violence motivated by gender., 25 It then goes on to define the
term "motivated by gender" as follows: "a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender and due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender., 26 There
is an interesting history behind this language. An early version of
the legislation would have presumed that crimes of rape and sexual
assault are per se gender-motivated. 27 That proved unpalatable to
the U.S. Congress, and it was dropped. Also, in an earlier version,
the legislation required only that the act was "committed because
of gender or on the basis of gender., 28 The additional requirement
of animus was inserted later under pressure from various forces,
including the federal judiciary and Senator Hatch, whose support
was very much needed to ensure its passage.29
So we now have a two-part definition. The first part-referring
to acts "committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender"-is based on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,30
and precedent under Title VII will be helpful in interpreting it.3"
The second portion of the definition relies on the term "animus",
a term borrowed from the caselaw under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),
24 See Anne Reifenberg, Domestic Violence Measure May Face Legislative
Hurdles, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 31, 1993, at Al (quoting Pat Reuss,
senior policy analyst for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, stating that
Congressional leadership was looking for "a bill that says we care about
women").
25 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b).
26 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1).
27 H.R. 1502, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
28 S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
29 A Legislative History, supra note 20.
30 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2 (1994).
31 S. REP. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 52-53 (1993) [hereinafter 1993
SENATE REPORT].
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commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.32 But it's important to
realize that the language is not identical to that which has been
applied under the Ku Klux Klan Act because the Supreme Court
has held that the Ku Klux Klan Act requires a showing of
"invidiously discriminatory animus," 33 whereas the Violence
Against Women Act requires simply animus.34
In the view of many observers, the term "animus" leaves some
ambiguity about how the law will be interpreted. The legislative
history does contain some clues, however. For example, a
defendant's actions that demonstrate a decision to victimize women
and not men can be sufficient evidence of animus.35 Also, the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report indicates that the finder of fact
should determine gender motivation based on the totality of the
circumstances. 36 And perhaps most important, the Report uses the
words "purpose" and "intent" as synonyms for "animus, ' ' 37 which
I think indicates that the burden on the plaintiff to show gender-
based animus is not as onerous as some have argued. There is no
need, for example, to show that the defendant harbored a subjective
animosity toward women; rather, you just need to show that the
gender of the victim played a role in the purpose or intent of the
defendant who committed the crime.
The major achievement of this statute is that it has created a
civil right specifically to redress violence against women. The
practical and symbolic value of this new legal right is enormous.
But the significance of the Violence Against Women Act goes even
further. The civil rights provision, as it was debated in Congress
and in the press, became a focal point for a broader debate about
the nature of rape and domestic violence and their impact on the
lives of American women.38
32 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) (Ku Klux Klan Act).
31 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
34 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d).
11 1993 SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 51-52.
36 1993 SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 52.
37 1993 SENATE REPORT, supra note 31, at 64.
31 See, e.g., Helen Neuborne, Mere Talk Won't Make Life Any Safer for
Women, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at B7; Eloise Salholz, Women Under
Assault: Sex Crimes Finally Get the Nation's Attention, NEWSWEEK, July 16,
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Many feminists are disappointed that the legislation no longer
contains a definition that would presume that rape and sexual
assault are always gender-motivated. 39 But this may be a blessing
in disguise. Now that the issue of gender motivation is going to
have to be litigated in each case,4" judges and juries will pick up
where Congress left off, and we may, as a country, have an
opportunity to continue the national dialogue on violence against
women that began when this legislation was pending. For all of
these reasons, the civil rights provision of the Violence Against
Women Act can be a powerful instrument in the continuing effort
to advance our understanding of what causes violence against
women and what we can do to stop it.
Thank you.
1990, at 23.
'9 See, e.g., David Frazee, An Imperfect Remedyfor Imperfect Violence: The
Construction of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, 1 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 163 (1993); Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun is Always Pointed:
Sexual Violence and Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L. J.
2197 (1992).
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) ("Nothing in this section entitles a person to
a cause of action.., for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts





From the Halls of Congress, let's travel to my office, and to the
Criminal Court, and to the Family Court, and to State Supreme
Court, and the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York, all here in Manhattan. On our tour, students and
practitioners alike, we'll talk about the important tool recently
given to us by some of our colleagues seated here beside me. The
Violence Against Women Act ["VAWA"] is an important new
weapon in our arsenal.' In the coming years it will be instrumental
in facilitating our efforts to obtain redress for victims of gender-
motivated violence.2
As we discuss VAWA, let's start with the following scenario:
a woman calls your office. She has been the victim of a gender-
based crime of violence. What legal remedies are available to her?
What courts can give her relief? How does the advent of VAWA
vary her options from those which have been traditionally
available?
Let's compare some of the remedies which we might pursue
under traditional theories of recovery with relief available under the
new Act. We'll consider how our options may overlap and whether
they can or should be pursued simultaneously. We'll also think
about particular obstacles we will be likely to encounter along the
way.
The Act tells us that it will provide compensatory and punitive
damages [and] injunctive and declaratory relief.3 Let's focus on
injunctive relief. In practical terms, when a judge grants such relief
the abuser is told: "Stop what you are doing and don't do it again."
" Brooklyn Law School, J.D.; New York University, M.A.; Boston
University, B.A. The speaker is a partner in Levinson & Kaplan and a general
practitioner specializing in family law and the problems of battered women.
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108
Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C.
(1994)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994).
3 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
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Injunctive relief comes in the form of a restraining order, some-
times called an "order of protection" or a "stay away" order.4 It
tells the assailant, "Don't come to the house. Don't come within
five blocks of the school. Don't come near the office." "Don't
communicate by telephone, letter, fax, e-mail or any other means."
Injunctive relief is available in various state courts. Orders of
protection are generally granted in connection with underlying
proceedings, such as a criminal complaint for harassment5 or
assault6 in the Criminal Court or for a family offense in the Family
Court.7 In the Supreme Court, orders of protection are available as
ancillary relief in divorce actions They can also be obtained in
civil damage cases, such as actions for money damages for assault
or other intentional torts.9 A bare summons for divorce, or a
summons and complaint in any other kind of action, is a procedur-
ally sufficient predicate to request injunctive relief.'I In cases of
domestic violence, it is common to serve an ex parte motion for
injunctive relief simultaneously with the divorce summons." This
is accomplished by moving by order to show cause.' 2
When proceeding in Criminal Court, we should keep in mind
that the "crime of violence" under VAWA must constitute a felony
4 N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW 530.13 (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 1996); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW §§ 240(3), 252 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996).
' N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.25, 240.26, 240.30, 240.31 (McKinney 1989 &
Supp. 1996). It is noteworthy that under New York's "stalking statute," there is
no felony for aggravated harassment based on gender. Id. § 240.25. The felony
charge is available only in cases of harassment based upon religion, race or
ethnicity. Id. § 240.31.
6 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00, 120.05, 120.10 (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1996).
7 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 842 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
' See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 240(3), 252; see also Kurppe v. Kurppe, 147
A.D.2d 533, 537 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1989); Richards v. Richards, 130
A.D.2d 642, 515 N.Y.S.2d 570 (2d Dep't 1987).
9 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R. 6301 (McKinney 1980).
10 Id.; see also DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 469 (2d ed. 1991).
" N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 6313(a), 2217(b) (McKinney 1980); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW 232 (McKinney 1986).
12 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 2214(d) (McKinney 1991).
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pursuant to state law.'3 If the evidence necessary to prove the
commission of a felony is strong, the successful pursuit of a
criminal conviction will satisfy one important element of the
plaintiff's proof under the Act. If the outcome of the prosecution
is in question, caution is in order. 4
Decisions made early in the life of a criminal prosecution can
have a dramatic impact on a woman's access to relief under
VAWA. Gender-motivated crimes, which can include acts of
domestic violence, are not always given a high priority by
prosecutors and judges. Prosecutorial discretion can be exercised in
favor of downgrading felony assaults to misdemeanor charges.'5
Prosecutorial indifference or judicial ignorance 6 and pressure to
reduce felonies to misdemeanors in order to reach plea bargains, all
can contribute to less than rigorous prosecution. In fact, the
majority of domestic violence cases charged in Criminal Court are
written as misdemeanors. Lucy Friedman, the director of New
York's Victims' Services Agency, who I'm glad to see here this
evening, is familiar with the problems in prosecuting these kinds of
crimes. 17
"3 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).
'4 The burden of proof in a criminal prosecution is "beyond a reasonable
doubt." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 70.20 (McKinney 1992). In a civil proceeding,
the burden is "by a preponderance of the evidence." PRINCE - RICHARDSON ON
EVIDENCE § 3-206 (Farrell ed., 11 th ed. 1995).
"5 A person is guilty of assault in the third degree, a class A misdemeanor,
when a person "with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes
such injury to such person ...... "N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00. In contrast to
assault in the third degree, and in more accord with the facts surrounding many
domestic abuse cases, a person is guilty of assault in the second degree, a class
D felony, when "with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person,
he causes such injury to such a person. .. ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05
(emphasis added). In New York, a class A misdemeanor conviction imposes a
maximum prison sentence of one year, whereas a class D felony conviction
allows for a sentence of up to seven years. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10.00(4), (5);
70.00(2)(d) (McKinney 1987).
6 Mary Hofford et al., Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An
Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197, 216-18 (1995).
17 According to Victim Services, in 1991 in New York City, "only 25 to
30% of domestic violence calls to the police resulted in written reports required
by law, and only 7 to 12 % resulted in arrests." Ariella Hyman et al., Laws
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On the other hand, an advantage to proceeding in Criminal
Court is that the District Attorney is responsible for prosecuting the
victim's case on behalf of the state. Thus, in the ideal case, where
a conscientious prosecutor will invest the necessary time and effort
to work hard to secure a good outcome, the complainant need not
have her VAWA counsel spend time and money developing the
proofs upon which a substantial portion of her federal claim will
depend.
In addition to the criminal and family courts, many women who
are the victims of gender-motivated violence have looked to the
matrimonial courts for relief. The results have often been disap-
pointing. New York, like many other states, has deliberately
obscured the connection between marital fault and the financial
outcome of a divorce case. Since the advent of the Equitable
Distribution Law in 1980, courts have routinely held that unless the
impact of marital fault is extreme and outrageous, it should have no
impact upon the economic outcome of a divorce action. 8 The
circumstances under which judges have been willing to compensate
wives with an increased share of equitable distribution awards for
actionable cruelty during the marriage are rare. In fact, courts are
more likely to award a greater portion of the marital estate to a
wife whose husband has committed economic waste than one who
has physically abused her.' 9 Indeed, some courts refuse to find
Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do They Promote Patient Well
Being, 273 JAMA 1781 (1995); see also Hillary Johnson & Francine G.
Hermelin, The Truth About White Collar Domestic Violence, WORKING WOMEN,
Mar. 1, 1995, at 54 (citing the Justice Department's 1994 National Crime
Victimization Survey which found that only about half the women who suffered
domestic abuse between 1987 and 1991 reported it to the police); Erik Kriss,
Domestic Arrests Up, but Few Get to Trial, SYRACUSE HERALD J., Nov. 17,
1995, at A17 (indicating that wives may not want their husbands convicted of a
felony for fear of losing financial support of self and child).
"S See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589-90, 489 N.E.2d 712, 719,
498 N.Y.S. 2d 743, 750 (1985) (holding that marital fault is not considered in
determining equitable distribution "except in egregious cases that shock the
conscience of the court"); see also Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 472
N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1984).
" Compare Kellerman v. Kellerman, 187 A.D.2d 906, 590 N.Y.S.2d 570 (3d
Dep't 1992) (granting wife divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment
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marital fault and thus grounds for divorce, even when physical
abuse has been proven.2" Even when physical violence justifies the
granting of a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman
treatment, it does not generally bring with it a financial result
which will compensate the wife for her physical or emotional
suffering. 2 Even if alimony is awarded to support a disabled
spouse, it tends to be of short duration,22 it is taxable to herE3
and it is terminable upon her remarriage or the death of the payor
spouse.24 Given the general failure of the matrimonial courts to
afford relief, VAWA can provide a welcome new remedy under
appropriate circumstances.
Another issue we should think about is the quality of proof a
plaintiff must sustain in order to obtain injunctive relief. A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate the
likelihood of prevailing on the merits.2 In the family and criminal
courts, that burden depends upon what must be proven to show the
commission of a "family offense" or a violation of the Penal Law,
which runs the gamut from felonies to misdemeanors to violations.
The likelihood of success on the merits may be stronger in the
Family Court and the Supreme Court, where the burden of proof
is "on the preponderance of the evidence."26
but denying economic relief because husband's misconduct, i.e., physical and
verbal abuse, did not warrant apportionment of marital assets in wife's favor)
and Conceicao v. Conceicao, 203 A.D.2d 877, 611 N.Y.S.2d 318 (3d Dep't
1994) (awarding wife 70% of marital assets where husband attempted to secrete
money and dissipate marital assets through gambling).
20 See Orofino v. Orofino, 215 A.D.2d 997, 997-98, 627 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461-
62 (3d Dep't) (holding that verbal and physical abuse which included throwing
an "ashtray at plaintiff causing a laceration to her scalp," threats to commit
arson, and placement of "the muzzle of a rifle to plaintiff s head and threat[ened]
to kill her" did not constitute marital fault), appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 706, 656
N.E.2d 599, 632 N.Y.S. 500 (1995).
21 See supra note 18.
22 See Zabin v. Zabin, 176 A.D.2d 262, 262-263, 574 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76-77
(2d Dep't 1991).
23 I.R.C. § 71 (1996).
24 Id.
25 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 6301.
26 See supra note 14.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
In the federal district courts, the plaintiff seeking injunctive
relief will be required to show the likelihood of success on her
underlying VAWA claim.27 In view of both procedural and
substantive matters which may become the subject of litigation
under the new statute, and in view of the fact that many federal
district court judges do not frequently deal with crimes of violence
inflicted by spouses or intimate partners, it may be most sensible
to seek immediate injunctive relief in state court. Keep in mind,
however, that VAWA provides for compensatory damages,
including attorney's fees and expenses incurred in obtaining an
order of protection in a state court.2 Also remember that VAWA
claims can be brought in state court if the climate in a particular
jurisdiction suggests a better result there.29
Another issue to be considered in selecting a forum, particularly
with respect to injunctive relief, is the duration of the order of
protection which the court is empowered to grant. In Family Court
a "permanent" order of protection can last only up to a maximum
of three years.30 In Criminal Court, it can last up to a maximum
of five years after a felony conviction.3 Under the new federal
civil rights act, a permanent injunction should be just
that-permanent.
In addition to injunctive relief, what other kinds of civil
remedies are available to victims of gender-based violence? In
civil proceedings, one can sue for money damages, i.e., economic
relief which is designed to provide a remedy for financial damages.
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
28 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
29 It remains to be seen how federal district court judges, most if not all of
whom have never received any education or training about gender-motivated
violence, will respond to actions under the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA"). If one decides to commence a VAWA action in state court for
reasons of strategy, such as the chances of litigating claims before a more
sympathetic or, at least, neutral court, the case cannot be removed to the federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d) (1994).
30 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney Supp. 1996) (requiring a showing
of aggravating circumstances); see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 827(a)(vii) (McKinney
Supp. 1996) (listing aggravating circumstances).
3 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.13 (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 1996).
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This may include lost wages, property damage, medical expenses
and damages for physical and emotional pain and suffering.32
Although interspousal tort immunity has been generally repealed
across the country,33 we have not seen a wealth of successful tort
claims against spouses or other intimate partners. One reason for
this failure is that intentional torts generally have short statutes of
limitations.3 4 In New York, for example, the statute of limitations
for intentional torts such as assault, battery, the intentional
infliction of emotional distress and the transmission of sexually
transmitted diseases is only one year.35
Attorneys in different parts of the country have tried to contend
with this problem in different ways. In an Idaho case, Curtis v
Firth,36 and two New Jersey cases, Giovine v Giovine37 and
Cusseaux v Pickett,38 courts have accepted the theory that
ongoing abuse creates a continuous tort, thereby removing the
impediment of a short statute of limitations.
Here in New York, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, I
am awaiting a decision in which I hope to toll the one-year statute
of limitations for Hedda Nussbaum in her assault case against Joel
Steinberg.39 This statute provides a toll for the commencement of
an action for plaintiffs who are incapacitated by reason of
32 It will be interesting to see what damages will be allowable under VAWA
for emotional pain and suffering unaccompanied by physical injury. Under state
law, such recoveries have been limited. See Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 891, 893-
94, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (1st Dep't 1976) (finding that damages in excess of
$25,000.00 were excessive in action brought by patient who proved that her
psychiatrist had had sexual intercourse with her as part of her "therapy").
31 See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-313 (McKinney 1989) (abolishing
interspousal tort immunity in New York); see, e.g., Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d
1096 (Del. 1993); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1987); Davis v. Davis,
657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983); Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979);
Merenoffv. Merenoff, 388 A.D.2d 951 (N.J. 1978).
3' N.B. The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of criminal
proceedings. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 215(8) (McKinney 1990).
31 Id. at 215(3).
36 850 P.2d 749 (Idaho 1993).
17 663 A.D.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995).
3' 652 A.D.2d 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994).
39 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 208 (McKinney 1990); Nussbaum v. Steinberg,
204 N.Y. L.J. 21, 21 (1990).
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"insanity," which term has been defined in McCarthy v
Volkswagen" as an "inability to function overall in society." What
is the statute of limitations under VAWA? For acts of violence
committed after 1990, a four-year statute of limitations will
apply.4 For acts committed prior to that date, we may still have
to litigate issues of continuous tort, tolling and equitable estoppel.
Another longstanding impediment to women victimized by
violent men has been the disinclination of the personal injury bar
to pursue these kind of tort claims. Tort attorneys are compensated
according to contingency retainer agreements which generally give
them one-third of the damages recovered, after reimbursement for
the expenses of the litigation which they have paid "up front."42
Under these circumstances, it has been difficult for plaintiffs with
mid-range or modest damage claims to find lawyers willing to
pursue their cases. While the civil rights remedy under VAWA
does not itself refer to attorney fees,43 fees are recoverable under
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees/Awards Act of 1976. 4' Thus, the
courthouse doors should be opened to many women whose cases
would not otherwise have been litigated.
My time is up, so let me conclude by saying that VAWA has
created a brand new civil rights cause of action for women. It will
broaden our clients' access to redress and permit us to seek an
entirely new federal civil remedy. By understanding the benefits
and limitations of relief available in state court, we can all look
forward to the challenge of implementing the new Act for the
benefit of our clients, the victims of gender-motivated crimes of
violence.
40 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 435 N.E.2d 1072, 1075, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460
(1992).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994).
42 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.7 (1995).
43 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
44 42 U.S. § 1988(b) (1994).
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Jenny Rivera'
Good evening. First let me thank the Association of the Bar for
inviting me tonight. I have been asked to address the strategic role
of the Violence Against Women Act' ["VAWA"] as part of a legal
reform struggle. Although ten minutes is not much time to talk
about decades of work, I would like to put this in a broader
context. I recently returned from Beijing, China, where I partici-
pated in the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women.2
I want to share with you some thoughts on violence against women
from a global perspective.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT-FROM BEIJING'S PLATFORM
OF ACTION TO THE VAWA
At the Beijing Conference there were thousands of women from
around the world gathered to discuss women's issues and strategies
for improving women's status. While some of you are familiar with
the Conference and its goals, many of you may not be fully
cognizant of what has transpired. It appears that media coverage
may not have provided an accurate and comprehensive portrayal of
what occurred at the Conference.' I will focus on those aspects of
the Conference relevant to this panel's topic. At the Conference,
. Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Columbia
University School of Law, LL.M.; New York University School of Law, J.D.;
Princeton University, B.A.
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108
Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C.
(1994)).
2 Rone Tempest, Beijing Women Speak Their Minds; Conference: Despite
Censorship, UN. Forum Has an Impact, Inspiring Hope, Envy and Anger, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at 4.
3 See, e.g., Laura King, Spotlight: Women's Conference Delegates Glimpse
the Past; A Walk Through Beiing Offers Stark Reminder, CINCINNATI ENQ.,
Sept. 11, 1995, at A2; Trudy Rubin, Women's Rights, Human Rights; Beijing
Brings Big Gain, MILWAUKEE J. & SENT., Sept. 17, 1995, at 1.
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participants discussed and finalized a Platform for Action,4 a
document which sets an agenda-a global agenda-for reform
throughout the world.
While many important issues were discussed at the Conference,
and subsequently were incorporated into the Platform, two issues
which took center stage during the Conference were the economic
empowerment of women and the elimination of violence against
women. These issues were at the forefront of the discussions in
Beijing, the topics of various plenary sessions and workshops, and
are persistent themes throughout the Platform for Action. These
issues were treated by the women at the Conference as intercon-
nected. Indeed, they are, for the latter is exacerbated by the absence
of the former. So in any of our discussions we must incorporate an
analysis of the economic status of women-all women-and the
distinctions between economic classes that exist in the United
States.
Globally, violence against women is manifested through
persecution, torture, rape and violence by intimate partners.' Much
of the violence occurs in private arenas, such as the home. Places
which traditionally have been a safe haven, but which for too many
women are war zones even during times of peace.' Many countries
encourage or support violence against women through their legal
4 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Adopted by the Fourth World
Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace, held in
Beijing, China, Sep. 15, 1995 (available on the Internet at:
gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/unconfs /women/off/a-20.en).
' See Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International
Law, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 326, 326-41 (1994) (discussing rape and sexual abuse
of women during armed conflict in the international arena); see, e.g., M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI & MARCIA MCCORMICK, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: AN INVISIBLE WEAPON
OF WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 1 (Int'l Human
Rights Law Institute 1996).
6 In their homes, women are the targets of violence committed by their
intimate-former and current-partners, the targets of sexual assault by
acquaintances and relatives, and, as they grow older, the targets of elder abuse
by children. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday:
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 349 (1994)
(arguing that "gender-based violence in the home plays a role-albeit a complex
one-in the formation of adult personality and in the perpetuation of discrimi-
nation and violence in families and the society").
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systems, policies and cultural practices.7 Even where violence
against women is illegal, or at least in theory carries the possibility
of some legal sanction, the violence continues.'
Domestic violence is blind to distinctions based on race, class,
ethnicity and sexual orientation. Women with limited financial
resources, without support mechanisms, and who are more isolated
due to various types of discrimination, such as discrimination based
on immigrant status or language, are in a unique position and
partially subject to isolation and dislocation.9 Informed by the truth
of the extent of violence globally, we must consider and assess the
' See generally Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling
and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 (1992) (presenting female genital mutilation from a
feminist perspective); Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, andRights: The
Future Legal Status of Palestinian Women, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149 (1994) (dis-
cussing the role of custom and women in the subjugation of Palestinian women).
8 In the United States, despite state and federal legislation, violence
continues to permeate the lives of women. Every year, three to four million
women suffer violence at the hands of their spouses and intimate partners. Nancy
Kathleen Sugg & Thomas Inui, Primary Care Physicians 'Response to Domestic
Violence: Opening Pandora's Box, 267 JAMA 3157, 3157 (1992). According to
one estimate, approximately 3.9 million women in the United States are abused
each year. Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and
Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273, 275 (1995) (citing
Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking, USA TODAY, July 21,
1992, at 9A).
The presence of violence within the home begins at an early age.
Approximately 3.3 to 10 million children in the United States witness domestic
violence each year. See MARTHA B. WITWER & CHERYL A. CRAWFORD,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, A COORDINATED APPROACH TO REDUCING
FAMILY VIOLENCE: CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS 35 app. B (1995) (citing HOWARD
DAVIDSON, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
CHILDREN (1994)). Young women are also experiencing violence at alarming
rates. One commentator has noted that one out of 10 high school students has
experienced violence in a dating relationship. See Stacy L. Brustin, Legal
Responses to Teen Dating Violence, 29 FAM. L.Q. 331, 331 n.1 (1995) (citing
Denise Gamache, Domination and Control: The Social Context of Dating
Violence, in DATING VIOLENCE, YOUNG WOMEN IN DANGER 73 (Barrie Levy
ed., 1991)).
9 Leslye E. Orloff et al., With No Place to Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy
for Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313, 324-29 (1995).
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Violence Against Women Act and its potential for genuine reform
as it affects the lives of women who have the least access to social
services, economic assistance and legal protection. Despite the
attractiveness of legal reform work, all laws have limitations. The
Violence Against Women Act is not a panacea.
II. THE VAWA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
The history of the civil rights struggle in the United States is
passionate and charged, and while the efforts of individuals in
organizations in those struggles have indeed reaped extraordinary
gains for people of color, and, consequently, all people in this
country, women of color have yet to fully benefit from those
struggles. Moreover, while the civil rights and feminists movements
brought women of color closer to the goal of equality, by all
measures-whether statistical or anecdotal-women of color have
not achieved similar gains as compared with both men of color and
with other women.' ° Equal opportunity and economic stability,
continue to be illusory for the majority of women of color for a
variety of reasons. First and foremost, because Latinas, African
American, Asian and Native American women face multiple
barriers to success and equality.
Discrimination based on race, national origin, ethnicity,
language and immigrant status are a daily reality for women of
color as highlighted by the following examples. Consider the attack
on reproductive rights and the related ongoing diminution in quality
health care services for poor women and women of color in the
United States." Discrimination is palpable in the anti-affirmative
'0 Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An
Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 231, 238-39 (1994); Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:
Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, 79 CALIF. L. REv. 775, 778, 796-97, 805 (1991); see also
Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities, Black Women, Work and Title VII, 14
HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 21 (1991).
" See Leslie G. Espinoza, Dissecting Women, Dissecting Law: The Court-
Ordering of Caesarean Section Operations and the Failure ofInformed Consent
to Protect Women of Color, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 211, 226, 234 (1994); Louise
G. Trubek & Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Searching for a Balance in Universal
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action legislation and rhetoric, 2 in the passage of Proposition
18713 and other anti-immigrant laws and regulations, 4 and in the
increasing number of English-only workplace rules," and, I think
most highlighted with respect to Latinas, in a recent case that came
out of Texas, which some of you may be familiar with, where the
judge denied custody to a Latina because she speaks to her child in
Spanish at home. 16 Judge Samuel C. Kiser accused the mother of
Health Care Reform: Protection for the Disenfranchised Consumer, 43 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1081, 1089-90 (1994); see also Charlotte Rutherford, Reproductive
Freedoms andAfrican American Women, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 255 (1992);
Julie F. Kay, Note, If Men Could Get Pregnant: An Equal Protection Model for
Federal Funding of Abortion Under a National Health Care Plan, 60 BROOK.
L. REV. 349 (1994).
12 Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1659, 1684 (1995) ("The anti-affirmative-action rhetoric of our time
perpetuates the dominant norm of whiteness by treating the current distribution
of power and access as natural and just. This rhetoric also makes the structural
economic problems of working-class whites invisible by blaming the advent of
people of color for the downturn in white working-class earning power.").
" 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West 1994); see also Kevin R. Johnson,
Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status,
Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1517-18, 1559-60 (1995).
'4 Johnson, supra note 13, at 1509, 1517-18, 1559-60.
's See generally Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 269 (1992) [hereinafter Perea, Demography and Distrust]; Juan F. Perea,
English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the
Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 265 (1990); see also Jenifer M. Bosco,
UndocumentedImmigrants, Economic Justice, and Welfare Reform in California,
8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 71, 86 (1994) (discussing racism against Asian immigrants
as seen in the "controversies over English-only rules"); Dottie Enrico, English-
Only Translates to Trouble, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9, 1994, at 7 (describing several
English-only rules implemented by employers); Seth Mydans, Pressure for
English-Only Job Rules Stirring a Sharp Debate Across US., N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
8, 1990, at A12 (citing the growing number of English-only job rules, many of
which are discriminatory according to civil rights agencies).
, For a discussion of the legal challenges that English-only rules in the
workplace have faced, see generally Jeffrey D. Kirtner, English-Only Rules and
the Role of Perspective in Title VII Claims, 73 TEX. L. REV. 871 (1995).
16 Sam Howe Verhovek, Mother Scolded by Judge for Speaking in Spanish,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at A12; see also Tim Chavez, It's Time to Stop
Blaming Latinos for the Ills of this Nation, UTICA OBSERVER-DISPATCH
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the five-year-old of "abusing that child and ... relegating her to
the position of a housemaid."' 7 This woman is fully bilingual and
fully competent to nurture her child. Nevertheless, her right to raise
and educate her child was jeopardized because she wanted her
daughter to retain some part of her culture. Cultural identity, in the
opinion of the court, is at odds with the "best interests" of her
child. 1
Within this theoretical and experiential context, we must
localize the VAWA. The VAWA is part of a continuum of legal
strategies. The VAWA can provide a bridge between what has been
typical civil rights litigation and gender-based legislation. As with
other civil rights legislation, the VAWA contains various elements
that are critical to the reform movement: the funding and facili-
tation of community, local anti-violence initiatives.' 9 It serves--or
can serve, depending on how we as activists are willing to use
it-as a centerpiece for community organizing. In a sense, it may
serve as a rallying cry, as Sally [Goldfarb] was saying, a way to
motivate all people, not just women, around the issue of violence
against women. For litigators, it provides a federal forum for
litigation. The federal courts have traditionally been seen as a more
hospitable arena than the state courts for antidiscrimination and
gender rights cases.20
(discussing the adverse attitudes by politicians toward Latino immigrants and
their measures to reduce immigration), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File.
Mother Scolded by Judge for Speaking in Spanish, supra note 16, at A12.
IS In the wake of pressure from the Latino community, Judge Kiser offered
a limited apology. Judge Kiser did not apologize for his order, but rather for the
public statements he made regarding his decision: "The order I signed stands, but
my apology for a mischoice of words in trying to explain the reasoning behind
it is sincere." Judge in English-Only Flap Apologizes for Insensitivity, L.A
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1995, at A4.
'9 42-U.S.C. § 10418.
20 For example, state courts do not provide adequate remedies for violence
against women. As of 1995, only California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, Vermont, Washington and the District of Columbia have
created civil remedies for such crimes. Federal courts may also be more attractive
because Federal Rule of Evidence 412 disallows intrusive questions about the
victim's sexual activity whereas many states still allow such questions. See
generally Julie Goldscheid & Susan Kraham, The Civil Rights Remedy of the
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In addition, the particularities of the VAWA which provide
assistance to women of color specifically or consequentially are
another example of the VAWA's position within a feminist and
civil rights context.2' The VAWA's inclusion of Puerto Rico
within its geographic coverage is of particular interest to Puerto
Rican women.22 This provides assurances and an additional
protection in terms of orders of protection and other types of court
orders for Puerto Rican women who may migrate between the
island and the states. The VAWA also provides for self-petition by
immigrant women for legally recognized status.23
As I have already stated, the Violence Against Women Act and
other antidiscrimination legislation are not a panacea; they are
fraught with limitations. A significant one for women of color, and
Latinas in particular, is awareness of the remedy. What good is a
law providing for civil lawsuit if you do not know about it, and if
you do not have attorneys in your community who are informed
about how to bring these cases and who recognize that the cases are
worthwhile? Consequently, public education is absolutely necessary,
and the Violence Against Women Act allocates funding for public
community education efforts.24
Funding allocation is insufficient without funding policies
which recognize and respond to the needs of diverse populations.
Therefore, grassroots organizations must receive funding to do
public education and outreach, so that we may continue with the
project that Sally [Goldfarb] described.
Violence Against Women Act, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 505 (1995); Jenny
Rivera, Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Prevention and Intervention Law and
the United States Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The Limitations of
Legislative Responses, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 78 (1995); Jenny Rivera, The
Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in
the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 461 (1996);
21 Two critical provisions for Latinas in particular are the geographic
definitions and the self-petitioning sections. See infra notes 22-23.
2 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10410(c) (1994). By law, Puerto Ricans are citizens
of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1994).
23 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1994).
24 42 U.S.C. § 10418 (1994).
25 See Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L.
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Moreover, interest and trust in the legal system are of critical
importance, otherwise, there is a breach of what I will call the
"social contract" with communities of color. The trust and
confidence of communities of color has been dwindling over the
last several years.26 It has dwindled as the Supreme Court and
lower courts continue to hack away at the civil rights of people of
color," and as demonstrated by the Texas case,2" as judges
become desensitized to the needs of women and women of color
specifically. That trust has dwindled with the denial of services
based on immigrant status and a woman's inability to speak English
regardless of citizenship. In addition, the denial of, or at least the
lack of provision for translation services and bilingual and
bicultural services to help women through the court system. These
services are necessary to help women negotiate the possible
remedies outlined by Betty [Levinson].29
& POL'Y 391 (1996).
26 For example, there is the "absence of the bonds of mutual trust among law
enforcement and [B]lack communities." Dwight L. Greene, Criminal Justice and
Race: Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of
Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1979, 2054
(1993); see also Perea, Demography and Distrust, supra note 14, at 362
("Americans share a common cultural heritage in which differences from the core
culture, including differences of race, national origin and language, have been
viewed as 'foreign' and subversive of American democracy.. . . Difference in
America has truly become a focal point of distrust .... ") (citations omitted).
2 Recent affirmative action, voting rights and Title VII cases illustrate this
point. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (striking down, under
equal protection analysis, Georgia's congressional redistricting plan which would
have considered race in order to ensure representation for people of color); Reno
v. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (striking down, under equal protection analysis,
North Carolina's congressional districts drawn in accordance with Section Five
of the Voting Rights Act, which similarly relied on race); Hopwood v. Texas,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4719 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996) (striking down Texas
School of Law admissions program and concluding that the use of racial
preferences in such a program constitute Fourteenth Amendment violations);
Spun Stake v. Garcia, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2726 (1994) (rejecting EEOC guidelines which treated English-only workplace
rules as per se discrimination).
2 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
29 Rivera, supra note 10, at 250-55 (discussing the different treatment of
Latinas in the legal and social service arenas and the lack of bilingual-bicultural
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No discussion of the civil rights' aspects of the Violence
Against Women Act could be complete without considering how
the VAWA addresses institutional and individual racism and bias
based on ethnicity and national origin within the judicial system.
There are sections of the Violence Against Women Act which
provide for appropriations to educate law enforcement officials and
judges.30 Nevertheless, education about the VAWA needs to be
integrated with a much fuller component of education dealing with
race-, ethnicity- and language-based discrimination as they exist in
the courts. Indeed, the existence and vitality of such discrimination
is the topic of many official reports.3'
There is also the issue of patriarchy and the attitudes of those
in the position of enforcing the laws, whether they be prosecutors,
judges or court officers. In a recent article, I compared the
Violence Against Women Act to domestic violence legislation in
Puerto Rico, legislation which predates the Violence Against
Women Act.32 I indicated how implementation of Puerto Rico's
law has been obstructed due to paternalistic attitudes of many of
the people in charge of enforcing the law. We have much to learn
from Puerto Rico's experience. We may conclude, based on such
experiences, that education in a vacuum is inefficient. There is a
need for extensive change in attitudes. Indeed, women and people
services and personnel within law enforcement and social services); see also
Sarah Eaton & Ariella Hyman, The Domestic Violence Component of the New
York Task Force Report on Women in the Courts: An Evaluation and Assessment
of New York City Courts, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 391, 407-08, 479-81, 487-88
(1992) (arguing that New York City courts do not adequately address the need
for bilingual services).
•30 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701, 13991, 13992, 14036 (1994).
31 See Judith Resnik, Symposium on Civic and Legal Education, Panel One:
Legal Education, Feminist Values, and Gender Bias, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525,
1539-40 nn. 65-69 (1993); see also Suellyn Scarnecchia, Symposium on Racial
Bias in the Judicial System: State Responses to Task Force Reports on Race and
Ethnic Bias in the Courts, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 923 (1993); Stephan
Thernstrom, Critical Observations on the Draft Final Report of the Special
Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender,
Race, and Ethnic Bias, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 119 (1995).
32 See Rivera, Puerto Rico's Domestice Violence, supra note 20.
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of color must be brought into legislative and law enforcement
positions in significant numbers to help facilitate such change.
As a final point, we must consider the intrusive nature of the
role of the state in enforcement, prosecution and adjudication of
these cases. For many women of color in this country the state has
acted not as a benevolent brother, but as an intrusive entity. The
state has acted as an arm that removes children from their homes
and their parents, which incarcerates men of color at statistically
significant high numbers, and which is unreceptive to the issues of
communities of color, thus devastating the communities.33 Thus,
the appropriateness and implementation of such measures as
mandatory arrest and their endorsement by the VAWA must be
analyzed and considered fully by reviewing comprehensively its
application within communities of color and its availability to
women of color.34 The role that the state plays in terms of the
implementation of the VAWA, in helping to eliminate violence
against women, must be assessed in light of this history and these
concerns. Thank you.
13 See Rivera, supra note 10, at 243-51 (discussing the historical animosities
and tensions between law enforcement officials and the Latino community).
34 See Rivera, supra note 10, at 243-49 (discussing the applicability of
mandatory arrest to the Latino community).
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Good evening. I am very pleased to join you this evening at
this forum on the topic of violence against women. Yesterday was
the anniversary of the passage of the Crime Bill,' and I was
reflecting on the way here about my experience over the past year
and how much has changed during this time.
The Violence Against Women Act 2 ["VAWA"] is landmark
legislation, combining tough law enforcement strategies with
important safeguards for victims of domestic violence and sexual
assault. In its first year, VAWA and its related provisions have
proven extremely effective in our effort to provide protection and
peace of mind for women and their families. Early on, the
Department [of Justice] adopted an aggressive implementation
strategy and moved quickly in reaching out to those who had
worked on the legislation to draw them into the planning process
for the Act's implementation.
Tonight I would like to thank the NOW Legal Defense ["NOW
LDEF"] and Education Fund for all of the support and honest
feedback they have given us at [the] Justice [Department] as we
have gone through the process of putting in place a number of
VAWA programs. I would also like to thank the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York for hosting this event.
In many respects, working on issues related to violence against
women has resulted in many wonderful reunions for me. Before I
was a lawyer, I worked in the late 70s in the D.C. community with
the shelter movement, helping establish a shelter called My Sister's
Georgetown University, J.D.; Marywood College, B.A. The author is a
deputy assistant attorney general at the Office of Justice Programs, Department
of Justice.
' Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42
U.S.C. (1994)).
2 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108
Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C.
(1994)).
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Place, then sponsored by the Women's Legal Defense Fund. I also
worked with friends and colleagues at the Women's Legal Defense
Fund drafting legislation for women to seek pro se protection
orders in cases of domestic violence.' Twenty years ago when I
worked on this issue, it was a very different time. The notion of
pro-arrest policies for a crime of domestic violence was unheard of;
shelters were scarce and victim advocates were a new phenomenon.
My work in the Administration on the issue of violence against
women has enabled a sort of homecoming for me with a number
of women's and victim's groups who have worked hard during
these years to get us where we are today. We have come far and
should take heart that there is a strong national commitment to
address problems of violence against women.
For those young lawyers here tonight, I want to say that it is an
important evening for you because one of the good things that we
women do for others is networking, and you have an opportunity
tonight to network with some very impressive people, and I am
excluding myself from that group. I am so pleased to be on this
panel with each of you.
To those of you here tonight who are experienced practitioners,
defense lawyers and prosecutors, you play a key role in your bar,
and in the New York community. I applaud you for the work you
are doing in your community to understand and increase the
understanding about this issue, and for your work in developing
effective programs to combat violence against women-violence in
the home, on the streets and in the workplace. You have access to
the decisionmakers. You are the ones who can help elevate this
issue in the bar. You are the messengers who can talk with the
judges, police and prosecutors and engage in the kind of public
education which remains so fundamentally important on this issue.
Many Americans, including some in the criminal justice system,
have thought of domestic violence as a private matter. However, we
must all take responsibility for helping to put a face on violence
against women so that it is no longer hidden behind doors.
The Violence Against Women Act delivers a heavy message. In
addition to creating new rights and remedies and turning statutes
' See D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-1003 to -1006 (1989 & Supp. 1995).
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protecting battered spouses into offensive weapons, VAWA has
served as an awakening. Historically, the government condemns
terrorism. We have efforts to take back our streets. The Violence
Against Women Act sends a message that it is about time that we
stop giving men the freedom to dominate and to terrorize women
in their lives! I want to explain a few reasons why I think this is
so.
VAWA is a rather comprehensive roadmap offering a variety
of programs, remedies and studies to address domestic violence and
sexual assault. For example:
" It authorizes the creation of a number of programs
through which states and localities receive
resources-incentives to engage in coordinating among
police, prosecutors, the courts and victim's groups, in
focusing efforts on these problems.4 In the past, we
have not implemented the type of coordinated response
that is envisioned in the Violence Against Women Act.
* Funds also are authorized for programs in rural juris-
dictions dealing with domestic violence,5 and for a
national hotline for victims to call for help.6
• A number of significant studies also can be conducted
as a result of the Act related to critical issues like:
0 The capability of state databases as they relate
to the enforcement of protective orders;7
* a study of the means by which abusive part-
ners obtain addresses of domestic violence
victims;' and
0 an effort by the National Academy of
Sciences panel of experts from a variety of
4 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10407 (1994) (information and technical assistance
centers); 42 U.S.C. § 10410 (1994) (state domestic violence coalitions).
' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13971 (1994).
6 42 U.S.C. § 10416 (1994). The national toll free number is 1-800-799-
SAFE.
7 42 U.S.C. § 13962 (1994).
' 42 U.S.C. § 14014 (1994).
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disciplines to develop a research agenda on
issues of violence against women.9
One of the areas which I was asked to address tonight relates
to current policy questions on the issue of violence against women.
While my colleagues tonight are focusing on the civil rights remedy
provision of the Act'--I am more of the generalist, here to talk
about the broader context surrounding that provision. This is not an
exhaustive list, but I would like to share with you some of the
questions that we constantly ask ourselves at the Department [of
Justice]:
* How do we enable the cultural change that must take
place among police, prosecutors and the courts? For the
system to work on behalf of victims in these cases, we
must find ways to go beyond the law in order to work
with the people and institutions charged with law
enforcement. For the system to work effectively-in a
unified manner-we must remove the institutional
barriers that keep us separate from one another. We
must develop a common understanding of each others'
strengths and limitations and perhaps re-examine
traditional approaches to how courts, prosecutors and
the police function.
" We are talking about people. This is after all about
people. How do we change attitudes? How can we
apply the notion of a problem-solving approach to
violence against women within and across institutions?
" How do we encourage the connections between the
non-profit, nongovernmental victim advocates-the
victims' services deliverers-and police and prosecutors
and the courts?
" What steps can we take at the federal level to draw into
discussions emergency room personnel, [and] members
of the health and mental health professions, to help
foster an integrated system locally?
9 42 U.S.C. § 13961 (1994).
'o 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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* How do we get the defense bar to the table? It seems
to me that there is somewhat of an ethical issue here,
but it does not operate as a bar to participation. How
do we draw into the discussions those who defend
batterers? I do not think batterers and those who defend
them can be dismissed simply as "bad people." Rather,
we need to find ways to draw the defense bar into the
process. How do we get a defense lawyer to the table
to talk about someone who is a chronically sick person
and whose sickness is beating his wife? What else
ought they be thinking about trying to do for their
clients?
Let me return for a moment to the programmatic aspects of
VAWA. The Violence Against Women Act is prescriptive in its
requirements for accessing funds. I serve in the Office of Justice
Programs, which is like the "foundation" arm of the Department [of
Justice]. We do not do prosecution, we do not do litigation and we
do not do investigations-those things most associated with the
Department of Justice. We administer a large amount of money that
is distributed to states and localities-police departments, victim
services agencies, prosecutors' offices, courts and nonprofit
organizations-to support programs in a variety of issue areas
related to crime and delinquency prevention, including violence
against women.
Through the Violence Against Women Act, the Department has
the statutory leverage to require systems to take an approach that
we hope will make a difference-a new approach that involves
collaboration and coordination among all the players. Our hope is
that these federal funds will be used to create an integrated system
of law enforcement, prosecution and victim services to address the
needs of battered and sexually assaulted women---one that will
provide greater safety to women, deter violent behavior by men and
provide equal treatment for cases of domestic violence and sexual
assault.
Training and technical assistance efforts are critical to support-
ing systemic change. Providing training for judges, police and
prosecutors, and offering information on "best practices," are both
central roles for the federal government, so that jurisdictions might
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learn from one another innovations taking place among police,
prosecutors and judges.
There are additional incentives for better treatment for victims
through VAWA. The Act requires a state, in order to qualify for
funds, to include nonprofit, nongovernmental victim service
providers in its planning." VAWA demands a planning process
and the development of a plan for the distribution of funds to
prosecutors, police and victim services agencies. There are also
certain statutory requirements that states must agree to in order to
qualify for funds:
* States must certify that they will not charge filing and
service fees in domestic violence cases,' 2 and
* states must also certify that the victim will not have to
pay for testing in a rape case."
Through our technical assistance efforts, we are working with
states and sharing ideas on how jurisdictions are handling these
provisions. Also through our technical assistance efforts, we have
brought together practitioners to learn from each other and to plan
together.
Another issue that I want to touch upon tonight is what we can
do at the federal level to help build the capacity for media and
public awareness campaigns at the state and local level. This is an
additional opportunity for us at the federal level in terms of helping
states and local people think about public awareness campaigns and
public education and media campaigns. We are working with some
very good people in the field, and want to be able to give guidance
and help individuals at the state and local levels to engage in
undertaking these campaign efforts.
There is an additional section in the Violence Against Women
Act that I want to mention tonight. It is what is known as the
Full Faith and Credit Provision. 4 It is not a self-enforcing
provision, but one in which the Department hopes can be helpful.
The Department will play a leadership role in working with the
42 U.S.C. § 3796gg-1 (1994).
12 Id. § 3796gg-5.
'3 Id. § 3796gg-4.
14 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
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states on issues related to intrastate and interstate enforcement of
protection orders. As we all know, jurisdictions have idiosyncratic
processes grounded in law and due process. A police officer in one
county, let alone one state who is handed a protection order from
another county or state by a battered woman is likely to say, "this
does not look like a form that I know. I cannot help you." At the
Department, we are analyzing the laws and working with the
Battered Women's Justice Project 5 to understand the steps that
need to be taken, the databases that need to be in place and the
training that must occur, for protection orders to operate effec-
tively.
Finally, there are several steps the Justice Department has
undertaken specifically with regards to the civil rights remedy
under VAWA. First, the Civil Rights Division is working with the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in examining the issues
that could emerge in relation to cases that may arise. To my
knowledge there has not been a case to date.' 6 On the other hand,
in the criminal area there already have been a couple of federal
prosecutions under VAWA,' 7 but we are studying the statute so
that when a case is brought we will be prepared. I know that we
can count on NOW LDEF to let us know when a case arises. Deval
Patrick, the assistant attorney general for civil rights, has met with
a number of you on this issue and will want to continue to talk
with you as things unfold.
In closing, I believe that during the past year we have put in
place substantial cornerstones and have made great strides in
undertaking programs to address violence against women. Much
remains to be done. Many of you have been terrific in helping lead
'5 The Battered Women's Justice Project is a national resource center on
civil and criminal justice laws, policy and practice. It provides technical
assistance to domestic violence advocates, law enforcement personnel, prose-
cutors, the private bar and courts.
6 Since this presentation, given on September 14, 1995, two cases have been
brought under the civil provisions of the Violence Against Women Act:
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 95-CV- 1358-R (W.D.
Va. filed Mar. 4, 1996) and Doe v. Doe, No. 95-CV-2722 (D. Conn. filed Feb.
12, 1996).
"7 Ex-Husband Indicted for Spousal Threats, 214 N.Y. L.J. 4 (1995).
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the charge to make sure the Violence Against Women Act was
included in the Crime Act that was passed in 1994.8 We at the
Justice Department promise to continue to move forward. In
closing, I would therefore like to echo the words of Attorney
General Janet Reno: "Unless we end violence in the home we are
never going to end it on the streets [of America]. ' 19
Thank you.
IS Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42
U.S.C. (1994)).
'9 Attorney General Janet Reno, Press Conference (July 19, 1994) (transcript
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File).
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As Julie [Goldscheid] suggested in her introduction, my task is
to put the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act
["VAWA"] in the broader context of issues of gender discrimi-
nation. I want to explore the possibilities of this aspect of the Act,
and the important and, I think, deeply radical meaning of the Act.
I will also identify some of the contradictions with respect to issues
of gender that are reflected in the Act.
The radical core of the Act is embodied in the notion that it is
a civil right to be free from violence, and that all persons within
the United States have a right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender.1 As has been the case in the articulation of
many other rights that women have fought for and identified,
particularly over the last twenty to twenty-five years, the core
concept of the right is important and profound. The Act states that
women are targeted for violence because of their gender. The
articulation of this concept in the Act is the culmination of the
process (as Sally [Goldfarb] and Nel [Brennan] and others have
described) by which the coalition around the Act came together.
The issue of gender is central in this articulation, for the Violence
Against Women Act states that the violence must be "motivated by
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Visiting Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School. New York University Law School, J.D.; The London
School of Economics and Political Science, M.Sc.; Bryn Mawr College, B.A.
The civil rights remedy states, in pertinent part:
(b) ... All persons within the United States shall have the right to be
free from crimes of violence motivated by gender ....
(c) Cause of Action. A person (including a person who acts under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus
deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section
shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief,
and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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gender." Like other important rights, VAWA is a potential vehicle
of empowerment and can have considerable impact.
At the same time, there are profound contradictions in the Act
itself and in the legislative history of the Act. We need to confront
these contradictions, in order to do the most effective job that we
can as litigators, strategizing with those who will be bringing
challenges and those who will be assisting in bringing challenges.
The framework in which I assess this Act is one that I have
described in much of my writing, and that I have discussed in other
contexts. It is the notion that there is a dialectical relationship
between rights and the politics or vision which underlies the
articulation of rights.2 A vision of gender equality led to the
passage of the civil rights provision, but the future of the civil
rights provision will also shape our vision of gender equality. Now
that VAWA has passed, we will see the slow case-by-case
implementation of the rights set forth in the Act and in this process
we will be determining whether the radical vision of gender
equality embodied in the Act will be realized. As Nel [Brennan]
suggested, it is a moment of enormous possibility and excitement
for those of us who have been involved with issues of women's
rights for many years, as well as for the younger lawyers in the
room.
The Violence Against Women Act has to be understood as part
of a continuum of reform of laws relating to gender violence over
the last twenty-five years. For example, respecting the law of rape,
there have been a wide range of reforms: the abolition of corrobo-
ration requirements,3 cautionary instructions,4 and the resistance
2 See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and Politics:
Perspectives From the Women's Movements, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986)
(setting forth a dialectical perspective on the relationship between rights and
politics by drawing upon the women's rights experience).
' See Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome,
Psychiatric Labeling and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1271, 1319 n.248, 1333
(1994).
4 The cautionary instruction began in England in the 17th century. A.
Thomas Morris, Note, The Empirical, Historical, and Legal Case Against the
Cautionary Instruction: A Call for Legislative Reform, 1988 DUKE L.J. 154, 154
(1988). The three common elements of the cautionary instruction are: "(1) rape
is a charge that is easily made by the victim, (2) rape is a charge that is difficult
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"to the utmost" standard.' Rape shield legislation has been enacted
in many states,6 and there has been wide recognition of both
formal and informal barriers to women obtaining justice in the
courts. But we also see that, even when we change the laws, social
attitudes lag and limit effective implementation. So, for example,
regardless of the change in the corroboration requirement or the
cautionary instruction, commentators of Mike Tyson's rape case
still ask, "why did she go to the hotel room? If she did, she was
asking for it." Jurors in stranger rape trials still want to know what
the woman was wearing. New laws can be vehicles for changing
social attitudes. Yet it is frequently a lag in social attitudes that
impairs the implementation of legal reform efforts. Social attitudes
must change for legal reform efforts to be meaningful.
We have also seen dramatic changes in the area of intimate
violence, or what has been known as "domestic" violence. The
concept of intimate violence as a harm did not exist twenty-five
for the defendant to disprove, and (3) the testimony of the victim requires more
careful scrutiny by the jury than the testimony of the other witnesses in the trial."
Id. at 154-55.
' Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1783
(1992); see also Rosemary J. Scalo, Note, What Does "No" Mean in
Pennsylvania?-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Interpretation of Rape and
the Effectiveness of the Legislature's Response, 40 VILL. L. REV. 193, 221 n. 151
(1995).
6 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045
(1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-86f(West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West 1992); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 725, § 5/115-7 (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (West 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (1994); KY. R. EVID. 412 (1995); LA. CODE EVID.
ANN. art. 412 (West 1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1992); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520j (West 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-68 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.015 (Vernon 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.090 (Michie 1995); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 (West
1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7 (West 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.43
(McKinney 1992); N.C. R. EvID. 412 (1992); OHIO R. EVID. 404 (1995); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1994); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7
(Michie 1988).
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years ago. There was almost no understanding of battering in the
way that it is understood now.7 Orders of protection, mandatory
arrest policies,' the notion of stalking as a crimeg-these are all
recent law reforms. The notion of gender violence as a civil rights
violation (not only in the Violence Against Women Act, but under
state law);' ° of violence against women as a hate crime;" of
freedom from gender violence as an international human right; 2
of tort remedies for battering-these are all legal remedies which
did not exist ten years ago. Each of these different remedies reflects
differing conceptions of the link between violence and gender
discrimination. But, we also see the familiar lag in social attitudes
that shape implementation of these legal reforms. The premise of
' ElizabethM. Schneider, Epilogue: Making Reconceptualization of Violence
Against Women Real, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1246-50 (1995); see also Martha
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman
Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 973, 977-82 (1995).
8 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (4) & (5) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1996)
(addressing police arrests on domestic violence complaints when they have
reasonable cause).
9 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1996) (defining and enjoining
"stalking"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1996)
(criminalizing repetitive harassment); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney
Supp. 1996) (addressing first-time harassment); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31
(McKinney 1989) (focusing on harassment based upon the race, color, religion
or national origin of another person); see also Richard Reoper, Madonna's
Stalker Got a Verdict He Deserved, CHI SUN-TiMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at 11;
Madonna Stalker Case Ends, NAT'L L.J, Jan. 22, 1996, at A8.
'0 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(a). (West 1998 & Supp. 1996)
(treating gender-based violence as a civil rights violation).
" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, § 32 (West Supp. 1995); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-28-46 (Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.078
(Supp. 1996).
12 The World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, which
promulgated the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, recognized
gender violence as an international human right: "Gender-based violence and all
forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those resulting from
cultural prejudice and international trafficking, are incompatible with the dignity
and worth of the human person, and must be eliminated." U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/24 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1668 (1993).
430
VA WA PANEL DISCUSSION
the Violence Against Women Act is that gender-based violence has
a systematic impact on women's equality. As Sally Goldfarb
suggested in her comments, gender violence has a role in keeping
women powerless, in keeping women subordinate; and it affects all
women, not just women who have been the targets of that violence.
It tells us to keep silent, to stay home and out of the streets, and to
stay out of the public arenas. It reinforces the notion of domination
and privilege, which, as Jenny [Rivera] observed, is fundamental to
patriarchy. But this link between violence and gender equality may
be difficult for society and courts to comprehend.
However, I want to suggest that while the impact of gender-
based violence as an issue of equality may be difficult for society
and courts to comprehend generally; but it may be easier for
society and courts to comprehend it in the area of rape than in
domestic violence. I would argue that there is a broader social
understanding of the role that rape, particularly stranger rape, plays
in keeping women down and powerless that has been commonly
understood in domestic violence. This is partially due to the fact
that, in public consciousness, "real" rape is more likely to be
viewed as involving strangers and taking place in public settings.
Domestic violence by definition involves intimates and more
conventionally "private" circumstances. However, rape and
domestic violence must be understood as on a continuum of forms
of gender terrorism. But in order for judges to understand and
interpret the meaning of the phrase "motivated by gender"
consistently with this radical vision, there will have to be an
extraordinary amount of public and judicial education. Judges will
have to interpret the meaning of "gender-motivation" in light of the
"totality of the circumstances."' 3 So a major issue is what will the
"totality of the circumstances" be? What "circumstances" will be
taken into account in determining whether violence was motivated
by gender?
There is an analogous problem of interpretation under the Hate
Crimes Statistics Act14-which does not, by the way, allow for
13 S. REP. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1993) ("Judges and juries will
determine motivation from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
event.").
14 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994).
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collection of data on the basis of gender, but only on the basis of
race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. The issue is what
circumstances indicate the existence of a "hate crime." I want to
share with you portions of the FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation] guidelines that have been applied under the Hate
Crimes Statistics Act in situations involving racial, ethnic, and
religious animosity, in order to highlight this problem of interpre-
tation.15 As I read these examples, try to translate them to the
context of violence against women:
[a] The offender and the victim were of different racial,
religious, ethnic/national origin, or sexual orientation
groups. For example, the victim was Black and the
offenders were White.
[b] Bias-related oral comments, written statements, or
gestures made by the offender which indicates
his/her bias....
[c] Bias-related drawings, markings, symbols or graffiti
were left at the crime scene. For example, a
swastika was painted on the door of a synagogue.
[d] Certain objects, items or things which indicate bias
were used ([such as] the offenders wore white sheets
with hoods covering their faces) or left behind by
the offender(s) ( ... a burning cross was left in front
of the victim's residence).
[e] The victim is a member of a racial, religious,
ethnic/national origin, or sexual orientation group
which is overwhelmingly outnumbered by members
of another group in the neighborhood where the
victim lives and the incident took place....
[f] The victim was visiting a neighborhood where
previous hate crimes had been committed against
's See Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime into Focus-The Hate
Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
261, 285 n.129 (1991) (quoting FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING SUMMARY REPORTING SYSTEM:
DRAFT HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES 2 (1990)); see also
Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crime Statistics: A Promising Tool for Fighting
Violence Against Women, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 107 (1994).
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other members of his/her racial, religious,
ethnic/national origin, or sexual orientation group
and where tensions remain high against his/her
group.
[g] Several incidents occurred in the same locality, at or
about the same time, and the victims were all of the
same racial, religious, ethnic/national origin, or
sexual orientation group.
[h] A substantial portion of the community where the
crime occurred perceives that the incident was
motivated by bias.
[i] The victim was engaged in activities promoting
his/her racial, religious, ethnic/national origin, or
sexual orientation group. For example, the victim is
a member of the NAACP, participated in gay rights
demonstrations, etc.
[j] The incident coincided with a holiday relating to, or
a date of particular significance to, a racial,
religious, or ethnic/national origin group ([such as]
Martin Luther King Day, Rosh Hashanah, etc.).
[k] The offender was previously involved in a similar
hate crime or is a member of a hate group.
[1] There were indications that a hate group was
involved. For example, a hate group claimed
responsibility for the crime or was active in the
neighborhood.
[m] A historically established animosity exists between
the victim group and offender group.'6
These examples offer a set of indicators or circumstances
which, in the racial context, are generally understood as suggesting
bias. As you can see, it is hard to draw easy parallels from these
examples to interpretation of gender violence under VAWA.
Consider the problem of the context of domestic violence which,
to begin with, is not commonly viewed as a "hate crime," but if
anything, a "love crime." Some of the legislative history of the Act,
particularly statements by Senator Joseph Biden, suggests that
16 Fernandez, supra note 15, at 285 n.129.
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"ordinary" domestic violence would not qualify as an act
"motivated by gender" under the civil rights provision.' 7 So then,
in the domestic violence context, how do judges interpret verbal
abuse, physical abuse or stalking? The problem is that the same
social attitudes that we have seen in other domestic violence
contexts, that it is a personal or family issue, prevent intimate
violence from being understood as an issue of gender. The view
that intimate violence is an "individual family problem," a matter
of privacy, 8 is likely to limit the implementation of the Act.
Thus, our task must be to do the public and judicial education that
makes the broader link to gender equality.
In a situation where a woman is beaten and there are gender
epithets, that's a different scenario, a scenario more analogous to
a traditional "hate" crime. But how often does that happen? Men
don't say, "I'm beating you because you're a woman." The deeply
gendered fabric of domestic violence is something that is easy for
judges to miss without substantial education. Perhaps I am overly
sanguine about the degree to which rape can ever be understood as
gender violence, and perhaps this is only possible in cases of
stranger rape. I am interested in hearing from members of the
audience as to whether you agree.
With the passage of the Violence Against Women Act we have
just started this process of change. The passage of the Act has just
opened the door. The same social attitudes which have limited the
effectiveness of reforms in the area of rape and domestic violence
may limit VAWA, or VAWA can become an instrument of change.
But it is only with the careful and thoughtful work of armies of
litigators, legal scholars and activists, many of you in this room,
that we have any chance to realize the potential of VAWA and
effectuate its radical vision.
Thank you.
7 See S. REP. No. 545, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1990).
"S See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CoNN.
L. REv. 973 (1991) (exploring ways in which concepts of privacy impact upon
violence against women).
